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Abstract
Macroeconomic policy in the Czech Republic has been based on a fixed exchange rate for most
of the post-1993 period and a conservative fiscal policy characterized by a government budget that was
close to balance combined with a tight monetary policy that sought to maintain high interest rates and to
restrict the growth of the money supply. Surprisingly, given the Czech Republic’s good starting
conditions for carrying out such a “soft landing” in its macroeconomic stabilization, the economy was hit
by a speculative attack on the koruna in May, 1997, andthe economy, which hadshown some signs of an
increasing tempo of growth, appears to have slid into recession. At the same time, inflation has proven to
be, while moderate by regional standards, surprisingly resistant to dropping below 10% per annum, thus
leaving the Czech Republic in an undesirable state of “stagflation”, with output declining, unemployment
rising,and inflation accelerating.
In this paper we argue that, although the fixed nominal exchange rate policy may have been
retained for too long, and that, while the mix of monetary andfiscal policies was inappropriate given the
desire for a fixed nominal exchange rate, the key problem for Czech policy both before and after the
abandonment of a fixed exchange rate policy was and is the persistence of arate of inflation that exceeds
that of its major trading partners by a large margin. After explaining the relationship between Czech
inflation, exchange rate and macroeconomic policies and the crisis of May, 1997, we examine some
explanations for the persistence of inflation in the Czech Republic at a level around 10%. We close by
examining the policy implications of our findings in the context ofthe Czech National Bank’s new policy
ofinflation targeting.
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Macroeconomic policy in the Czech Republic has been based on two pillars: a fixed exchange
rate for most of the post-1993 period and a conservative fiscal policy characterized by a
government budget that was close to balance combined with a tight monetary policy that sought
to maintain high interest rates and to restrict the growth of the money supply. The Czechoslovak
and, later, Czech, koruna was initially devalued well below what many thought its long-run
equilibrium rate to be. In part, this over-devaluation reflected anxiety over the country’s ability
to successfully reorient its trade toward the West and in part it was to serve as acushion to make
the fixed exchange rate credible (Brada and Kutan, 1997). That is, it was assumed that, for some
time after the beginning of the transition, Czech inflation would be higher than that in the Czech
Republic’s major trading partners. Consequently, over time, this inflation differential would lead
to a gradual appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (see Figure 1), an appreciation that
would be cushioned not by nominal devaluations but rather by gains in productivity and by the
country’s exporters’ growing ability to sell their goods on the global market. A fixed nominal
exchange rate maintained under such circumstances could both serve as a nominal anchor and
establish foreign investors’ confidence in the koruna, thus encouraging capital inflows into the
Czech Republic. Simultaneously, conservative monetary and fiscal policies would serve to
reduce gradually the domestic rate of inflation, so that real exchange rate appreciation would be
modest, and, hopefully, whendomestic inflation rates approached those in the two countries, the
Federal Republic of Germany andthe United States, to whose currencies the koruna was pegged,
real appreciation would have led to a nominal rate that was roughly consistent with external
equilibrium.Surprisingly, given the Czech Republic’s good starting conditions for carrying out such a “soft
landing” in its macroeconomic stabilization, the economy was hit by a speculative attack on the
koruna in May, 1997, and the economy, which had shown some signs of an increasing tempo of
growth, appears to have slid into recession.1 At the same time, inflation has proven to be, while
moderate by regional standards, surprisingly resistant to dropping below 10% per annum, thus
leaving the Czech Republic in an undesirable state of “stagflation” (Table 1), with output
declining, unemployment rising, and inflation accelerating.
In this paper we argue that, although the fixed nominal exchange rate policy may have
been retained for too long, and that, while the mix of monetary and fiscal policies was
inappropriate given the desire for a fixed nominal exchange rate, the key problem for Czech
policy both before and after the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate policy was and is the
persistence of arate of inflation that exceeds that of its major trading partners by a largemargin.
After explaining the relationship between Czech inflation, exchange rate and macroeconomic
policies and the crisis of May, 1997, we examine some explanations for the persistence of
inflation in the Czech Republic at a level around 10%. We close by examining the policy
implications of our findings in the context of the Czech National Bank’s new policy of inflation
targeting.
II. INFLATION AND THE EXCHANGE RATE: THE POLICY DILEMMAS OF
ORTHODOXY
As Table 1 shows, the Czech Republic followed what appeared to be aconservative fiscal policy,
although with some increase of the government deficit over time.2 Simultaneously, the money
supply grew more slowly than nominal GDP (Table 2), showing that monetary policy, too, was
aimed at reducing inflation. At the same time, the low growth of the money supply in aperiod of
increasing monetization on the economy tended to create something of a credit crunch, with
3interest rates rising from 1994 onward so that the average rate on new credits ranged from 13 to
over 16 percent and the three month PRIBOR from 10 to 16 percent (Table 3).
The peg of the koruna at such an undervalued rate, combined with these high interest
rates provided a highly profitable opportunity for foreign investors. They could invest at high
Czech interest rates with little or no exchange risk, particularly as the peg allowed deviations
from the central rate of only 0.5 percent. This almost riskiess opportunity increased in
attractiveness over time as the credit-worthiness of the Czech Republic improved (Table 4). The
interest-rate differential between the Czech Republic andGermany was quite large and persistent
through 1996, as Table 5 shows.
The upshot of this situation was that short-term capital inflows accelerated after 1994
(Table 6). Some of these short-term inflows represented loans to Czech firms, who preferred
such credits to paying higher domestic rates, but much of the short-term inflows as well as some
of the long-term investment were motivated by foreign investors’ desire to take advantage of the
relatively riskless interest rate differential.
The Czech National Bank had relatively little room for maneuver. So long as inflation
persisted around 10%, it had to maintain a tight monetary policy, including positive real
borrowing, if not deposit, rates. If it were to allow the short-term capital inflows to affect the
money supply, it feared that the resulting expansion of M2 would put to an end any hopes of
lowering inflation, and thus lead to excessive real exchange rate appreciation that might force a
nominal devaluation. Unless fiscal policy could be made more restrictive, the Bank had to
engage in massive sterilization, with aresultant expansion of international reserves. However, so
long as inflation, and thus nominal interest rates, could not be brought down to West European
levels, the Bank had no means of escaping from this policy cul-de-sac.
The untenable position of the Bank is evident from Figure 1, which shows the evolution
of the real effective exchange rate and the trade balance, and from Table 6. The Bank had to
4maintain a tight policy in order to try to halt inflation, but in the process it encouraged capital
inflows, even as the real appreciation of the koruna and a growing current account deficit were
starting to make investors nervous that anominal devaluationwould be necessary.
A.. Widening the Fluctuation Bands ofthe Koruna
The Bank inadvertently, or perhaps, more accurately, intentionally, contributed to
investors’ uneaseby widening the band within which the koruna could fluctuate from ±0.5% to
± 7.5% on February 28, 1996. This was an effort to introduce a measure of exchange rate
uncertainty for foreign investors, and it was the outcome of a policy debate within the CNB and
within the government that datedback at least to early 1994. The problems being causedby large
inflows of short term capital had been of concern to policy makers, and a variety of measures,
including capital controls, taxes on capital flows, and devaluation or revaluation of the koruna,
had all been considered as possible ways of reducing capital flows. However, most participants
in these debates sought measures that would reduce short-term capital inflows without harming
the country’s reputation with international bankers and without any seeming backsliding from
the liberal international trade and payments system that had been created in the Czech Republic.
The freeing of controls over capital outflows on October 1, 1995, which effectively made the
koruna fully convertible, was an early outcome of this policy debate, but the amount of money
that Czech citizens may have wanted to deposit overseas was trivial, certainlywhen compared to
the massive short-termcapital inflows into the Czech Republic.
By 1996, the value of the widening of the fluctuation band or the koruna was
questionable. Perhaps increasing uncertainty and reducing short-termcapital inflows would have
been beneficial in 1994 or 1995, although at that stage the result might have been nominal
appreciation rather than depreciation. In 1996, the result was not merely a slow-down in capital
inflows, but also a significant outflow of short-term investments. Moreover, either the CNB or
Czech economic policy in general seems to have subverted the objective of the widening of the
5bands by preventing the koruna from moving very widely within its new bands, particularly in a
downward direction, when the measurewas first introduced (see Figure 2).
Thewidening ofthe fluctuation band ofthe koruna wasannounced on February 28, 1996.
Within three hours of the announcement, the koruna had fallen by about 2.5% on the interbank
market as foreign investors sold korunyfor foreign exchange or entered into contracts to do so in
the future to protect their investments in the country against exchange rate risk. The downward
slide was arrested by the selling of foreign exchange by Czech exporters, who sought to
capitalize on thedepreciation ofthe koruna and through the intervention ofthe CNB, which used
its dollar holdings to purchase 2.5 billion korunyon the afternoon ofthe
28
th~(JIlek and Jllková,
1998, pp. 72-73). The CNB continued to support the koruna in the next three days through
further interventions and through the regular foreign exchange fixings, expending about 17.9
billion koruny ($663 million). In the following week, the Bank repurchased about 1.3 billion
koruny in foreign exchange, thus ending with a reduction in short-term investments in the
country of 16.6 billion koruny ($615 million).
While the IMF (1997, p.4.7) viewed this maneuver rather favorably, arguing that it
provided monetary policy greater autonomy in that, with less enthusiasm on the part of foreign
investors to place short term capital in the Czech Republic, the Bank could pursue its policy of
tight money withoutthe burden of having to sterilize large capital inflows. However, as soon as
the CNB used its greater autonomy and raised interest rates, the koruna promptly began to
appreciate and short-termcapital to return to the country, especially in view of the fact that the
koruna was appreciating rather than depreciating. Noteworthy in this scenario is the swing
toward a mildly expansionary stance of fiscal policy (Table 1) over this period. Clearly, with an
appreciating real exchange rate, maintaining external and internal equilibrium required a
tightening ofboth monetary and fiscal policy. Because fiscal policy was not used, this placed the
6entire burden ofadjustment on monetary policy, but an effective monetary policy required higher
interest rates and restrictions on credit emission, which would only serve to exacerbate the
problem of short-term capital inflows, increasing the country’s vulnerability to speculative
attack.
B. The Speculative Attack on the Koruna
In early 1997, a number ofevents combined to bring just such a speculative attack about.
Exogenous factors included the crisis in Asia and consequent investor nervousness about all
emerging economies. The unraveling of the government of Prime Minister Václav Klaus both
increased political uncertainty and made it difficult for the government to adjust fiscal policy
appropriately and to ensure that necessary reforms, particularly in the banking sector would be
carried through . The Klaus government was rocked by a series of scandals and defections that
sharply reducedboth its popularity and its ability to make tough decisions. Consequently, when
the need to defend thekoruna by means of a tighter fiscal policy became evident, the government
proved unable to act decisively oreffectively. On April 16, 1997, itadopted a series ofmeasures,
the so-called “small package”, which called for cuts of25.5 billion koruny in budgetary outlays;
controls over the growth of wages in the state sector; acceleration and strengthening of reforms;
and the introduction of a 20% deposit on imports of consumer goods. These measures, in the
words ofthe CzechNational Bank (1997, p.1), “. ...were found insufficient by investors”.
The growing political uncertainty in the Czech Republic and the nervousness caused by
the Asian crisis caused foreign investors to reevaluate the Czech Republic’s fundamentals. As
Figure 1 shows, the real exchange rate had been appreciating and the trade deficit had been
growing, financed largely by inflows of foreign capital. There was some concern that, in real
terms, the koruna wasovervalued. Although this would not seemto be the case (see Halpern and
Wyplosz (1997) and Brada(1998)) , government reports that exports had not grown in the first
quarter of 1997 may have persuaded investors otherwise and led them to believe that the trade
7deficit would continue to grow beyond its then level of over 8.2% of GDP. Bad results on the
trade front were reinforced by the publication of data showing a decline of 3.5% in industrial
output in the first quarter of 1997, the culmination of a deceleration in this sector that had begun
in mid-1996.
There were also elements of a speculative bubble in the korunas’ exchange rate
movements after the widening of the fluctuation bands. Perhaps because the CNB had
intervened so vigorously to avoid a devaluation when the bands were widened, investor
perception ofexchange rate risk seems to have remained low forthe remainder of 1996, and with
higher interest rates in the CzechRepublic, thekoruna began to appreciate (see Figure 2) so that
by February 1997 it was 5.5% above its central parity. It was about this time that foreign
investors’ concerns began to manifest themselves, and capital inflows dried up although the fall
in thekoruna’s value wasrathergradual and modest so that, at the end ofApril, 1997, it was only
about 2.5% below its central rate. . By early May, 1997, the unraveling of the government and
unfavorable economic news industrial triggered a speculative attack on the koruna that was
characterized by large sales ofkoruny by foreign banks on May 13 and 14. These sales pushed
the kuruna’ sexchange rate toward the lower interventionpoint.
At first, the Czech National Bank sought to defend the koruna. Starting on May 15, 1997
it began to intervene on the foreign exchange market, expending nearly $2.5 billion in reserves
during the entire episode, which lasted less than two weeks. Interest rates were raised. The 3
month PRIBOR reached 35%, and the Lombard rate rose from 14% to 50%. The Bank also used
administrative measures to limit foreigners’ access to koruny by prohibiting local banks from
lending koruny to foreigners.
These measures proved insufficient in the face of continuing bad news about the
economy and the growing inevitability of the collapse of the Klaus government. Amidst
evidence that residents were also losing faith in the koruna, on May 26 the Bank announced the
8end of the fluctuating band regime for thekoruna. On May 27, the koruna fell by approximately
12% on the foreign exchange markets, and this seemed sufficient to quell further speculation.
The following day, the government announced a new package of fiscal measures, whose main
effect was to double the spending cuts proposed in the earlier “small package” ofreforms.
This relatively tranquil denouement suggests that, as Begg (1998) argues, the
fundamentals for the Czech Republic were not as catastrophic as some observers had thought.
The koruna rather quickly recovered about half of the decline it had suffered during the crisis
although the foreign exchange market remained rather nervous for the remainder of 1997.
C. Macroeconomic Consequences ofthe Crisis
While the Czech Republic weathered its currency crisis much better than did most other
emerging economies, with the worst damage being a $2 billion loss offoreign exchange reserves,
the crisis failed to resolve all of the fundamental problems afflicting the country’s
macroeconomic and foreign exchange policies. In part, this is due to the fact that the koruna
rather quickly regained much ofits strength, and as Figure 2 shows, its nominal ratein mid-1998
was about the same as it had been in 1995-1996. Given the approximately 10% per year
inflation in the intervening period, the koruna’s real appreciation appears to be continuing, with
the 1997 crisis doing little to alter thelong-term dynamics ofthis process.
Nevertheless, there were some positive outcomes from the crisis. The first of these is an
unexpected, given exchange rate movements, dynamism in exports. As Table 7 shows, exports
have grown through the first half of 1998 despite the continuing real appreciation ofthe koruna.
More understandable was the slowdown in imports, which can be attributedto both greater fiscal
restraint (see Table 8) and its consequences and to an improvement in Czech terms of trade
caused mainly by falling import prices. The latter should also have helped reduce domestic
inflation because the declines occurred mainly in the prices ofenergy and raw materials, so that
9these price decreases should have spread throughout the economy in the form of falling
production costs.
Second, macroeconomic policy finally began to have some effect on aggregate demand.
As Table 8 shows, while industrial production continues to grow in real terms, construction has
been hard hit by the high interest rates. Another positive outcome is that real wages, and, indeed,
household incomes, began to fall, thus helping to offset some of the effects of real appreciation
on the competitiveness ofCzechexports and also helping to reduce inflationarypressures.
Nevertheless, there have also been negative consequences as well. The data for early
1998 in Tables 1, 6 and 8 show that economic growth has halted, inflation has increased and
short-termcapital inflows have resumed, fueled by interest rates that are two to threepercentage
points higher thanthey were before the crisis struck (Table 3). These high interest rates reflect in
part the need to adjust nominal interest rates to the higher levels of inflation that followed the
crisis (Table 1) but the also reflect the factthat, without a significant nominal depreciation of the
koruna, tight monetary policy is required to maintain external and internal balance. In this sense,
there has been no change in Czech macroeconomic policy. Moreover, as the data in Figure 2
suggest, the koruna is appreciating again, likely in response to the interest rate differential
between the Czech Republic and western countries, which is now greater than it was before the
crisis. In sum, the net result of the crisis is that the Czech Republic and its central bank are
caught in the same policy trap that existed before the crisis. The nominal devaluation of the
koruna has been relatively minor, but interest rates are higher than before. With the same
exchange rate, the trade deficit is likely to remain intractable in the long run. Unless fiscal policy
is overhauled to generatea much larger surplus, a possibility that is unthinkable given the current
political situation, then the only possibility for avoiding a similar, and perhaps even more
debilitating, speculative attack on the koruna is to see a significant decline in the rate of inflation.
Here the surprise of Czech inflation continues. Despite falling real wages and falling prices of
10imported industrial inputs and of energy and raw materials, inflation has accelerated in the
aftermath ofthe crisis (Table 1).
III. INFLATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC: CAUSES AND CURES
Given thefiscal and monetary policies followed in the CzechRepublic, the persistence of
“sub-moderate” inflation in the neighborhood of 10% is rather puzzling, and a number of
explanations have been put forward. Among the more prominent are thefollowing:
A. Undervaluation of the Koruna. Some observer such as Desai (1998) and Richards and
Tersmann (1996), argue that inflation in some transition economies is the result of the initial
depreciation oftheir currencies. This inflation is not the outcome of the usual wage-price spiral
induced by devaluation, but, rather, it is the result of the workings of the law of one price, or
commodity arbitrage, which creates domestic inflation to as to reestablish purchasing power
parity. While this argument seems plausible in that higherprices oftradables should in some way
lead to a general price increase, the exact mechanismhas yet to be spelled out by the proponents
ofthis theory. Moreover, any plausible model of tradable-led inflation would have to imply that
the prices of tradables would be significantly higher than the prices of nontradables and that this
wedge would persist for some time if it was to drive an inflationary spiral. However, tradeables’
prices in the Czech Republic rose only modestly faster than those of nontradables after the
devaluation of the koruna, and non-tradables prices closed the gap relatively quickly thereafter.
Moreover, the law of one price, while plausible from a theoretical standpoint suffers from the
fact that deviations from purchasing power parity in the post-Bretton Woods period have been
large and persistent formany countries(Rogoff, 1996)
B. Inflation Is the Result of Relative Price Changes. A characteristic oftransition economies is
that their relative prices were badly distorted. Given the downward stickiness ofprices, the bulk
11of price readjustment in the course of transition thus occurs as some prices increase by large
amounts and others either remain constant or increase by relatively smaller amounts.
Pujol and Griffiths (1998) find that sectoral price changes in Poland during 1989-1995
were, indeed, quite skewed, suggesting that, in each period, some sectors were experiencing
relatively large price changes while the prices ofother sectors were closelybunched. Moreover,
the standard deviation of sectoral price changes around the mean was quite large, and this high
standard deviation did not decline much over their sample period. While the authors are able to
correlate skewness and dispersion of sectoral price changes with inflation, the issue ofcausality
remains open. Coorey et al.. (1998) find that the variance of relative prices does have a
significant impact on the rate of inflation in 21 transition economies. For the period following
the initial period ofprice liberalization in Central European countries, whenthere was a burst of
inflation and a period of large relative price changes, neither the variance nor the skewness of
sectoral price changes appear to have had a significant impact on the rate ofinflation, suggesting
that perhaps it is this initial burst ofinflation and relative pricerealignment that drives the results
obtained by Pujol and Griffiths.
Given the mixed results available on the effects of price variability on inflation in
transition economies, it would seem to be somewhat ofa heroic leap to conclude that such price
variability is, indeed, the cause of persistent inflation in the Czech Republic. A considerable
period of time has passed since the initial liberalization ofprices, and the available evidence on
price movements in the Czech Republic suggests that there is much less relative price change
occurring nowthan there was in theearly transition.
C. The Freeing ofControlled Prices. A variety of prices, mostly having to do with government
and municipal services, utilities and rents, were not fully liberalized in the Czech Republic
during the price liberalizations of 1991 and 1992. Rather, the government adopted a program of
phased liberalization. In some cases, controlled prices were to be increased in an hoc manner
12until they reached equilibrium, and then prices could be decontrolled. In other cases, increases
were based on a formulawhereby prices would increase by a factor equal to the previous years’
inflation plus some pre-specified percentage, so that they would outpace inflation but by only a
limited amount and thus move toward equilibrium at a controlled pace. Many municipal services
were to be priced on a cost-plus basis (see CzechNational Bank, 1998a, Table 3b). These goods
account forabout 22% ofthe consumerprice index (CPI).
The argument for such a price setting patters leading to a persistence of inflation is that
having a part of the consumerprice index basket contain goods whose prices would necessarily
grow at rates that exceed the past inflation rate would make it extremely difficult to reduce
inflation quickly because the burden of slowing price growth below the rates of past inflation
would thus fall on those goods in the consumer price index whose prices were not set in this
way. Moreover, as prices ofcontrolled goods are freed up, largeon-time increases move the CPI
upward in a waythat may disguise thebroadertendencies in prices.
In December 1997, as part of the complete overhaul of its approach to monetary policy,
the CNB adopted this view of the problems of reducing inflation and adopted a new measure of
inflation called net inflation (Czech National Bank, 1998a) . Net inflation represents the
movements of unregulated prices only, further adjusted for the effects of indirect taxes and the
elimination of subsidies. The Bank also uses another index, the adjusted inflation index, which
excludes foodprices so as to provide an even more stable measure of inflation.
According to the Czech National Bank’s own data, this argument would seem to be only
partially correct as an explanation for the persistence of inflation in the Czech Republic.
Regulated prices account for less than 20 percent of the CPI basket, and, through the end of
1995, increases in the prices ofregulated goods played only a small part in overall inflation. In
the second halfof 1997 and the beginning of 1998, prices ofregulated goods increased sharply,
and thus price increases in this category of goods did account for about one-halfof the increase
13in theCPI in some months. Nevertheless, even in this period, inflation ofother goods, especially
ofnon-regulated services, also increased, and the CPI based on non-regulated goods, which had
moved within a range of 4.6% to 8.2% on a monthly basis in 1996 and 1997 accelerated to
nearly 8% in early 1998 (Czech National Bank, 1998b). Consequently, if we assume that
regulated prices would increase at rates no faster than those of non-regulated goods, Czech
inflation would certainly have been lower, but not markedly so. Moreover, when one examines
the CPI on a disaggregated basis, then it becomes evident that non-regulated services, which are
also non-tradables, have seen their prices increase at much faster rates than the prices of
tradables in the CPI. Thus, if we assume that regulated services’ prices were to increase at the
same rate as other non-tradables, then the Czechinflation record would again worsen.
D. Wage-Push Inflation. Nominal wages in the Czech Republic (Figure 3) have grown more
rapidly than has the CPI, so that real wages grew by in excess of 6 percent per year in 1995-
1997. Productivity gains were much lower, ranging from 5 to 1 percent over this period. Some
observers argue that this is the result of poor corporate governance in Czech firms. This
argument is rather too facile, as there areexamples of many other countrieswith different forms
of corporate governance where real wages have increased rapidly also. Moreover, labor market
conditions in the Czech Republic have been tight, largely because of the boom in services,
especially those connected with banking and with tourism. Nevertheless, real wage creep does
have to be considered a potential source ofinflation.
E. Foreign Trade Prices. Tradables account for 67.2% of the CPI, and eliminating 20% ofthe
regulated goods, which are all non-tradables, means that 86% of the net inflation measure is
based on the prices oftradables. Thus, given the stability ofthe koruna and its recovery after the
May 1997 crisis, it is somewhat surprising that Czech price increases can continue to outpace
foreign inflation adjusted for the koruna’s depreciation. Indeed, if one separates tradables and
non-tradables in the CPI or in net inflation, then it is quite evident that the foreign trade sector
14has had an important moderatinginfluence on inflation in the CzechRepublic (see, forexample,
Czech National Bank, 1998b Table 4). Thus, for the prices that are subject to domestic policy
rather than endogenous, the Czech record of inflation is much worse that the CPI and net
inflation suggest.
In sum, the persistence of inflation in the Czech Republic is rather difficult to explain.
While a shift in focus toward net inflation makes the “official” level of inflation lower, a closer
look reveals that much ofthe remaining sources of inflation are domestic in origin. Moreover,
while it is true that net inflation, by netting out increases in regulated prices that are beyond the
control of the monetary authorities, does eliminate some arbitrary and exogenous causes of
inflation , the economic relevance ofnet inflation is unclear. Consumers react not to net inflation,
but rather to all inflation that affects their spending power. The value of the koruna depends on
its ability to command goods; notjust unregulated goods, but all goods in the economy. Nominal
interest rates must reflect total inflation, not just the increases in the prices of some goods. Thus,
while net inflation may, arguably, give a more precise indication ofhow well the CNB is doing,
its relevance for real economic processes should not be overestimated.
IV. INFLATION TARGETING IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
With the abandonment of a fixed exchange rate, the CNB had to redefine its policy
objectives because the koruna would no longer serve as a nominal anchor and policy target.
Because of this, the Bank’s principal policy instrument, control over the money supply, also
became irrelevant. Consequently, the Bank turned to a policy of inflation targeting. The new
policy was announced in a press release on December 22, 1997. The concept of net inflation
discussed above is a key component of the new policy because all inflation targets are set in
terms of net inflation. The Bank set two targets, a “control” target of 5.5-6.5% at the end of
1998 and a three—year target of 3.5-5.5% by the end of 2000 (Czech National Bank, 1998a)
15The Bank further stresses its continuing adherence to its obligation to maintain the stability of
the koruna and to continue the process of disinflation in the Czech Republic and in fact to get
inflationbelow 10%.
The Bank further stressed the advantages of inflation targeting over more traditional
approaches to monetary policy, one of them being its greater transparency relative to policies
that target either monetary aggregates or the exchange rate. In its adoption ofinflation targeting,
the CNB was in fact joining a numberof central banks in developed market economies. Indeed,
countries as diverse as Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand all are said to
use inflation targeting (Mishkin and Posen, 1997) , although not all observers seem to agree on
this point. In any case, the essence of monetary policy in countries following inflation targeting
is to set inflation targets and then to pursue them without regard to output and employment
(McDonough, 1997).
A key question for central banks that seek to implement inflation targeting is the
relationshipbetween inflation and the instruments such as the money supply, the interest rateand
the exchange rate that the banks can deploy to control inflation. In the case of the CNB, this
would seem to be aparticularly crucial and problematic question. On the one hand, the Bank has
argued that a stable relationship between monetary aggregates and the money supply cannot be
found in the Czech Republic (~ihákand Holub, forthcoming). Interest rates are to some extent
captive to the need to maintain sufficiently high lending rates to prop up the shaky Czech
banking sector and, given capital inflows and the ability of Czech firms to borrow abroad, the
effect of interest changes on inflation would seem to be relatively minor. Finally, while the
exchange rate plays an importantrole because ofthe share of tradables in the net inflation index,
exactly how the Bank can control the exchange rate, and especially whether the Bank should
seek to reduce inflation by seeking a nominal appreciation ofthe koruna seems doubtful.
16At the same time, the recent events cast considerable doubt on the Bank’s, and the
government’s, commitment to inflation targeting. During the first part of 1998, inflation was
sufficiently high to cast doubt on the bank’s ability to meet its 1998 inflation target, one reason
that the target was rechristened a “control target”. However, as the economy slowed, and
particularly as the koruna strengthened and as the price of imports fell, the inflation targets for
the year became increasingly more attainable (Wall Street Journal, 1998). At the same time,
unemployment has continued to grow to 6.8% in October and output has continued to decline,
leading the government to criticize the Bank’s policies for contributing to the recession. The
Bank has responded with a series of interest rate cuts, the latest in mid-November bringing the
repurchase rate to 11.5%, down 3.5 percentage points from its January highs of 15%. At the
same time, the growth of the money supply has accelerated. Despite this, the koruna in mid-
November stands at 17.8/DM, a significant appreciation over the beginning ofthe year.
A key question now is what the course of fiscal policy will be. The Zeman government has
proposed an expansionary budgetfor 1999 to deal with the recession. It calls for as deficit of 31
billion koruny, which would represent a significant swing from the restrictivefiscal policy stance
of 1998. At the best, the economy continues to be trapped in the dilemma of high inflation
unaccompanied by an nominal depreciation of the koruna; at the worst, it may be headed for
another crisis like that ofMay 1997, this time perhaps with more serious consequences.
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FOOTNOTES
For a description ofthe relatively favorable situation ofthe Czech Republic, at least
with regard to inflationarypressures, on theeve ofreform, see Drabek et al. (1994).
2. Unseenin the Federal government’sdeficit arethe increasing deficits oflocal and municipal
governments.
3. International markets appear to be skeptical ofthese policies as well. Standard and Poor’s
lowered the Czech Republic’s credit rating from A to A- in November, 1998.
19Table 1: Czech Macroeconomic Indicators (1993-1998)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998Q1 Qil
Real GDP growth (%) -0.9 2.7 6.4 3.9 1.0 -0.9 -2.4
CPlgrowth(%) 20.8 10.0 9.1 8.8 8.5 13.3 12.7
Current accountlGDP (%) 0.0 -0.1 -2.7 -7.6 -6.1 -3.5
Budget surplus! GDP (%) 0.1 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -1.0
Unemployment (%) 3.5 3.2 2.9 3.5 5.2 5.5 5.6
Nominal exchangerate(koruny/dm) 17.6 17.8 18.5 18.1 18.3 19.05 18.5
Sources: Komer~nI banka, Economic TrendsNo. 17 (July, 1998), page 1. Czech National Bank, Monthly Bulletin,
1998, No.4 and No.8. Czech National Bank, Zpráva a mënovév~ioji v CeskéRepublice za obdobILeden-Zaft 1996,
pp. 49-52.
Note: Even though its value was fixed against a basket of the $ and dm, the koruna (end of period) fluctuates
against thedm because of fluctuations in the $!dm exchange rate and the koruna’speg against a basket of dm & $,
subsequently also because of the introduction of wider bands in 1996, and, finally, due to the abandonment of the
peg in May, 1997.
20Table 2: Growth of Nominal GDP and Money Supply, 1995-1998










Sources: Komer~nIbanka, Economic TrendsNo. 17 (July, 1998), page 26 and Czech National Bank, Monthly
Bulletin, 1998, No.4 and No. 8.




INTEREST RATES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC (1993-1998)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998Q1 Q2
Interest Rate on New Credits
koruny 14.94 12.28 13.24 13.42 16.18 15.87 15.95
Forex 5.33 5.74 5.56
PRIBOR (3 month) 13.15 9.14 10.95 12.02 16.00 16.01 15.61
Source: Czech National Bank Bulletin, 1997 No. 4, and 1998, No. 8.
22TABLE 4
CREDITRATINGS OF TRANSITION COUNTRIES,1991.1997
(Rank among countries; numerical rating in parentheses)
Country 1991 1993 1995 1996 1997
Czech Republic 54 40 (66.20) 41 35 44 (71.23)
Hungary 35 44 (60.70) 44 44 45 (70.80)
Poland 80 80 (41.81) 72 55 48 (68.05)
Slovak Republic 54 64 (46.31) 51 49 61(61.63)
Romania 65 74 (43.00) 64 61 74 (52.96)
Russia 108 138 (25,96) 142 85 78 (50.72)
Source: Euromoney, March 1994, 1995, September, 1996, December, 1997.
23TABLE 5
INTEREST RATES AND EXCHANGE-RATE-ADJUSTED
RETURNS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC 1991 AND 1996
(percent)
1991 1996
Country Interest $ yield DM yield Interest $ yield DM yield
Rate Rate
Czech 7.03 4.23 9.73 6.79 5.44 -0.36
Republica 14.08 11.28 16.78 12.54 11.19 5.39
MEMO ITEM
Germanyb I 6.27 II I 2.83
Notes: a — The top interest rateis the depositrate, the bottom is the loan rate.
b — Depositrate.
Sources:
German depositrates are from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, CD-Rom,
January 1998.
Exchange rates are from PlanEcon Reports, various issues.
24TABLE 6
CZECH BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (1994-1998)
(CZK Billions)











of which: 97.0 218.3 116.6 34.3 24.1
Directlnvestment 21.6 67.0 37.7 40.5 7.7
Portfolio Investment
24.6 36.1 19.7 34.4 -0.5
Long-term Capital 31.9 89.4 84.4 12.9 -12.1
Short-term Capital
19.0 25.8 -25.2 -53.5 28.9
Sources: See Table 1
25Table 7: Czech Exports, Imports and Trade Balance, 1997-1998
($ mil.)
!997 1998
Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Qi Q2
Exports 5291 5808 5472 6207 6266 6615
Imports 6649 6879 6280 7359 6707 7122
Balance -1358 -1071 -808 -1152 -441 -507
Source: Czech National Bank, Monthly Bulletin, Nos. 7 and 8, 1998
26Table 8: State Budgetand Macroeconomic Aggregates 1997-1998
1997 1998
I II III IV I II
State Budget (bn. czk) -8.5 -14.8 -10.2 -15.7 7.6 1.8
Growth ofReal (in %).~
GDP 1.2 0.5 -0.1 2.2 -0.9 -2.4
Industrial output -2.6 5.5 5.7 9.6 8.4 5.1
Construction -5.6 1.3 -6.5 -5.3 4.2 -9.0
AverageWage 6.2 6.0 2.3 -1.5 -2.1 -5.1
Source: See Table 7
27Figure 1: Czech Real Exchange Rates and Trade Balance, 1992-1997
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32Figure 3 Czech Monthly Wages in Industry, 1993-1998
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